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COMMITTEE REPORT TO THE SENATE
ON SEPARATION OF AIR-MAIL PAY
FROM SUBSIDY*
By

EDWIN C. JOHNSON

United States Senator from Colorado; Chairman, Committee on
Interstate and Foreign Commerce.

S.436, "THE AIR MAIL SUBSIDY SEPARATION ACT OF 1951"**
T

HE enactment of this bill (S. 436) will occasion a major change in
policy of the Federal Government toward the development of commercial air transportation by privately owned and managed airlines of
the United States. It will provide for the determination of payments
to airlines for the transportation of mail and authorize separate payments of subsidies to airlines when justified to carry out national interest objectives. Accordingly, the Post Office Department will be
relieved of paying airline subsidies.
The basic purpose of the legislation is not to eliminate airline subsidies in their entirety but to disclose their extent and character. To
the extent they have contributed to the deficit in the Post Office
Department's budget this will be eliminated. Moreover, it will
return to Congress its constitutional responsibility to review the justification for continued direct subsidy grants to the certificated air
carriers, an impossibility under the Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938.
However, it is not intended to alter the fundamental objective of that
act, which is to provide Government support to foster the development and control of an air transportation system which will adequately serve the needs of our commerce, the national defense, and
postal service, and to bring stability, through controlled competition,
out of the chaos that was developing in the industry before 1938. In
all of these objectives, the legislative program carries the specific
endorsement of the Hoover Commission.
The bill replaces section 406 of the Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938
with an entirely new section. Payments for the transportation of
air mail will continue to be made out of funds appropriated to the
Post Office Department. Mail rates are initially set by the bill for
* Senate Report No. 629, 82nd Congress, first session. Edited slightly.
** With only minor amendments to S. 436 as reported out by the Senate
Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, the bill was passed by the
Senate on September 19, 1951 and referred to the House of Representatives.
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domestic and for overseas mail services.' These rates are subject to
modification from the outset and subsequently may be adjusted from
time to time by the Civil Aeronautics Board on the basis of cost.
Rates for foreign air services by United States carriers will be set by
the Postmaster General.
Such subsidy grants as may be justified will be determined by the
Board and payable to certificated air carriers from funds appropriated
to the Board for that purpose. They may be awarded to support
an appropriate air transportation system in the interest of the national
defense, the economic development, and the air commerce of the
United States. If the national defense of the country makes it advisable to augment civil aviation facilities and services beyond their
natural economic level, this objective should be recognized as a proper
security cost. Undoubtedly, the essentiality of many schedules,
routes, and entire carrier systems will require careful review by the
Board. In the foreign field dependence on subsidy may well be
justified and, following maritime precedent, contracts up to 5 years
in length are authorized to cover subsidy requirements for foreign
air transportation, with an appropriate recapture clause in event of
excess earnings.
The effective date for the separation of subsidy from air-mail pay
for domestic and overseas air services is July 1, 1952, and July 1,
1953, for air-mail transportation to foreign countries.
The bill amends the 1938 act (1) to require the approval of the
Postmaster General before the Board may issue a new certificate of
public convenience and necessity authorizing the transportation of
mail only and (2) to require the Postmaster General to dispatch by
aircraft all mail bearing air-mail postage except under unusual conditions where the mail would be unduly delayed if routed by air.
Section 406 of the Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938 directs the Civil
Aeronautics Board to fix fair and reasonable rates for the transportation of mail by aircraft, including an undisclosed additional amount,
when required, for subsidy purposes. The 1938 act does not specifically require the Board to publish how much of a particular rate is for
"service" and how much is additional "need" subsidy, and the
Board has never done so. However, in a few mail rate proceedings
the Board has found that the carrier did not require "subsidy" and so
fixed what it designated to be a "service" rate.
No other promotional public utility statute is known to commingle
a service payment with direct subsidy grants in the manner of the
Civil Aeronautics Act in such a way as to keep the two elements
1 The act defines air transportation in see. 1 (10) as "interstate, overseas, or
foreign air transportation or the transportation of mail by aircraft." Interstate,
overseas, and foreign air transportation are further defined in sec. 1 (20). "Overseas" means transportation between a place in the United States proper and a
place in a territory or possession of the United States or between places in two
such Territories or possessions, but "interstate" includes transportation between
places in the same Territory or possessions.
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completely hidden. Prior to 1936, ocean steamship companies were
subsidized in a comparable manner through the mechanism of mail
payment, but this led to abuses and was replaced by the Merchant
Marine Act of 1936 with provisions for direct subsidies on the basis
of construction and operating differential costs. The Interstate
Commerce Commission fixes fair and reasonable rates for the transportation of mail by railroad without authority to include subsidy in
such rates.
SUPPORT

FOR IMMEDIATE SEPARATION

For many years, committees of Congress, executive departments,
and interested private groups have contended that they are entitled
to know the extent of the Government's commitments of promotional
grants to the airlines.
During the 2 years that your committee has been studying this
problem, pressures have grown steadily in favor of immediate legislation to separate air-mail pay from airline subsidies. In general, it
may be said that all interested groups that appeared before your committee during its recent hearings, with the exception of the feeder airlines, favored immediate action. The Hoover Commission, the large
airline companies, the Air Transport Association, various labor groups,
business and taxpayer associations, and representatives of surface
forms of transport joined in this chorus. While generally not opposing
legislation, witnesses representing the newest and less firmly established feeder airlines expressed great concern lest separation legislation
interfere with adequate subsidy support for them.
Since neither the Board nor other interested parties had presented
any adequate legislative and administrative program, your committee
was forced to develop its own approach. Extensive staff studies were
conducted and a preliminary study was made for the committee by
an independent national firm of accountants and management engineers, Ernst & Ernst, covering the principles and technical standards
which they recommended should be incorporated in any legislation
to accomplish separation.
Realizing that the only realistic need for subsidies which could be
demonstrated was through relating in specific figures the losses incurred in serving nonmetropolitan areas the chairman of the committee asked the Senate Appropriations Committee in May 1950, for an
appropriation to conduct special studies along this line. By allocating
revenues and expenses including compensatory mail pay to all of these
communities served it was anticipated a clear picture would be had
of excess service, inadequate service, duplications and the need for
improvement in the traffic pattern. For these purposes $200,000 was
authorized in the General Appropriations Act of 1951 (P. L. 759), and
on the floor of the Senate a request to include the international problems affecting separation was recognized and included.
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Out of the $200,000 appropriated to your committee to cover its
contracts to competent engineers and accountants, the following
contracts were made:
Ernst & Ernst-Allocation of Subsidy to Airline Communities.. $145,000
Ernst & Ernst-Mail Rate Structure Based on First Class
Passenger Fares ......................................
5,000
Aircraft Consulting Service-Factual International Studies, etc. 10,000
Aviation Advisory Service-Subsidy Policies of

12 foreign countries ...................................

Balance unexpended .......................................

6,500

$ 33,500

Out of these surveys and the 99 days of hearings in which everyone
interested in the subject was enabled to present his views, your committee feels competent to recommend legislation to separate airline
mail pay from subsidy payments with full confidence and assurance
that the splendid airline industry of the United States, which has developed until it leads the whole world, will not be injured but on the
contrary will be made stronger and more self-reliant.
INITIAL CLASS MAIL RATES

Five classes of initial compensatory mail rates for domestic and
overseas airlines are set up in section 406 (a) (1) of the bill for the
sole purpose of insuring that the legislation will separate mail pay
from subsidy on the date specified in the bill, and not permit the old
system of commingling mail pay and subsidy to drag on. These
rates are 45 cents, 60 cents, 75 cents, 90 cents, and $1.80 a ton-mile
and are intended to apply to intrastate, interstate, and overseas air
transportation of mail. These are generous rates which shall be
employed on the effective date if the Board has not found it possible
to set other rates.
Your committee concurs in the opinion expressed by many witnesses who appeared at the hearings and objected to Congress reverting
to the practice of establishing specific transportation rates. If the bill,
however, had left the Board to fix the initial rates after "notice and
hearing," under the procedures established by the Civil Aeronautics
Act and the Administrative Procedures Act, any affected airline might
invoke his rights of judicial review and delay at length the proceeding.
This would mean that the old system of combined mail and subsidy
payments would have to be continued indefinitely and there also
would be confusion and possible impairment of the mail service during the transition period.
Your committee has followed the precedent of the Railway Mail
Act of 1916 which established initial rates for various classes of railway
mail and at the same time directed the Interstate Commerce Commission to launch an investigation with authority to revise the rates
set by that act. This is what is proposed by S. 436, as reported by
your committee.
The only action that the Civil Aeronautics Board must take before
these initial rates can be employed is the classification of carriers into
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the five classes provided in the bill according to the standards provided. The classification is to be made by the Board "on the basis of
types of communities served, services rendered, and route patterns."
This initial classification of carriers is authorized without notice and
hearing. The bill, however, specifically provides that any carrier
may petition for reclassification and may be heard thereon.
As part of the initial class rates, your committee has provided a
15-pound minimum weight provision in recognition of the overhead
expenses involved in handling small dispatches of mail and in providing regular standby service for the mail even though mail loads are
2
not always available.
As we have said, these initial statutory rates are intended only to
accelerate the transition to compensatory service rates for domestic
mail. We do not envisage that these rates should remain in effect
interminably or that the Board should countenance unduly delaying
procedures by the carriers in such adjustment of these initial rates as
may subsequently be determined to be necessary. The Board is
authorized to initiate proceedings at any time and to replace the
initial rates, as of any date after starting a proceeding, with its
own rates as determined in accordance with the cost standard specified.
Directive Against Delay and Withholding Mail
Under the existing act, the relations between the Post Office and
the airlines have been generally satisfactory. The very policy of
commingling mail pay with subsidy needs in the 1938 act puts the
Postmaster General in a position where it makes little difference to
his over-all budget whether he places the mail on a low- or high-cost
carrier. To the extent that mail is withheld from a high-rate carrier,
its rate must be further increased for the mail it does carry so as to
meet its over-all financial "needs." Under these circumstances, the
Postmaster General pursued the commendable practice of delivering
mail to competing carriers in a manner that would best expedite its
delivery. A rule of thumb was followed that, whenever two carriers
had schedules that would deliver the mail within 1 hour, the mail
traffic would then be divided between them.
Most of the smaller airlines which normally have higher unit costs
and would expect to receive higher mail rates expressed great fear at
the hearings of your committee that the Postmaster General might
2 Whenever mail is dispatched the minimum provision will operate in this
manner. Each shipment of mail consisting of the closed pouches and outside
pieces sent as a single dispatch to one destination post office will be considered
to weigh not less than 15 pounds. For example, if mail is dispatched at city A
on a flight to three cities, cities B, C, and D, the weight of the dispatch to each
city will be considered to be not less than 15 pounds, or a minimum total of 45
pounds for the three dispatches. The rate paid for each dispatch will then be
computed at the airport-to-airport mileage to the city to which it is addressed.
The committee is informed that the recent average weight of all domestic air
mail so dispatched is about 11.6 pounds and, although some consolidation of dispatches of mail may be expected (and at the same time not delay the delivery of
mail or withhold it from any carrier), this minimum provision should more than
double the pay on dispatches to or from more than 300 to 400 smaller airline cities.
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change this practice for the sake of postal economy. These witnesses
pointed out that this attitude would deprive them of all mail traffic
whenever they competed directly with lower-cost carriers. Your
committee believes this would be a calamity, and would make impracticable different rates for classes of carriers because of the significant extent of competition between them.
As one solution, your committee considered adopting a uniform,
two-element, weight-and-distance-block, mail-rate structure similar
to that now used for fixing the rate5 of air-express shipments. It also
considered the feasibility of equalizing mail rates between carriers on
competing trips, as suggested at the hearing by Mr. C. R. Smith,
president of American Airlines, but was advised that this suggestion
would introduce "extremely complicated procedures." Your committee, after due deliberation, concluded that to work out a universal
rate structure along either of these proposals, or otherwise could
best be undertaken by the Board within the framework of the cost
standard contained in the bill.
For the Post Office to withhold all mail from a competing carrier in
order solely to utilize a lower-cost carrier would, in the opinion of your
committee, be an unsound practice which could seriously disturb the
present system of privately operated air-transport systems. Your
committee, therefore, decided that in order to prevent any such possible
discrimination by the Postmaster General it should, place a direct
statutory mandate in the bill. Thus, section 406 (a) (1) provides
that the Postmaster General shall not delay mail or withhold it from
an air carrier because the rates for such mail may be higher than the
rates payable to a competing air carrier. The public is entitled to
the earliest feasible delivery of this mail, and this has been and should
continue to be the practice of the Postmaster General. The Postmaster General is not required to dispatch mail on every plane
departure because express authority is given to him in section 406 (a)
(1) to designate the schedules which he requires for the best postal
service; prompt delivery is the controlling standard.
RATE-MAKING

STANDARDS

FOR DOMESTIC

MAIL

One of the most controversial issues which developed during the
course of the hearings was the question of the standards to be applied
in establishing compensatory rates for the transportation of mail
domestically. This is the heart of the problem of separating mail rates
from subsidy. To the extent that a proper standard for such determination is not incorporated, the bill will fail of its purpose.
The basic product of an airline is the sale of space and lift capacity
in its transport aircraft. Some of that space is sold to passengers, some
for the carriage of mail, some for the carriage of freight, some for the
carriage of express. Because the carrier must make provisions for
extra loads of both mail and passengers in order to perform adequately
his obligations to the public at peak periods, he must also have avail-
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able a certain amount of unused space. This means that at slack
times of the day or in off seasons the total capacity of the aircraft will
not be used and that the over-all utilization of the aircraft will be
considerably below that for which the airplane is capable.
Many of the proponents of subsidy-separation legislation urged the
adoption of a rigid cost standard which would require that compensatory rates not exceed the fully allocated cost of the air carriers in
providing the mail service, plus a reasonable return on the investment
specifically devoted to that service. It was urged in support of this
position that in no other way could it be made certain that the compensatory rates established by the Board would not include some
element of subsidy. In other words, the adoption of a rigid cost
standard was regarded as a prerequisite to the full accomplishment of
the major purpose of the legislation, namely, separation of mail pay
and subsidy.
The air carriers, on the other hand, vigorously opposed the adoption of such an inflexible standard. They pointed out, and presented
the testimony of expert witnesses, that in an industry such as the air
transport industry, where 80 percent or more of the total costs are
joint (i. e., are attributable to all classes of traffic carried) , it is impossible to determine "the" cost of carrying any one class of traffic.
They insisted that allocation formulas, no matter how carefully developed, will produce results that are at best arbitrary and that it is
"impossible to come up with anything that would have any practical
value in fixing iir-mail rates."
The air carriers also insisted that, apart from the impossibility of
determining costs on any accurate basis, there'are many other importent considerations which must be taken into account in establishing compensatory rates. They referred to numerous considerations
affecting the value of the service rendered by the carriers, including
such things as the power of the Postmaster General to require the
establishment of schedules for the benefit of mail service; the authority
of the Postmaster General to fix regulations for the handling of mail
and the enforcement thereof with administrative fines. They urge
that value-of-service considerations should be given substantial weight.
Because of the importance of this matter, and in view of the vigor
with which objections were made to the use of the cost standard, it
has been necessary to give careful consideration to the problem.
The Cost Standard
Upon initial consideration it might appear that the same principle
should apply to payments for the carriage of mail as exists in many
other areas where the Government deals with private interests on a
cost-plus basis. The procedure might seem to be extremely simple:
It would merely be that the carrier is entitled to recover all its properly allocated costs for performing the service, including a fair return
on investment. As further consideration is given to the question,
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however, it becomes apparent that the problems are complex and
difficult. A simple cost-plus formula would of necessity have to be
determined on a retroactive basis. This has two overwhelming disadvantages - first, it provides the carrier with no incentive for reducing costs; second, it does not give the carrier any certainty as to what
his future income from the carriage of the mail might be.
It is, of course, not too difficult to determine in respect of each
service the cost which may be specifically identified therewith. That
is, those activities of a carrier which are devoted exclusively to the
carriage of the mail could be determined and assigned thereto. However, the sum of these costs represents only a small fraction of the
total cost to the carrier. Ernst 8&Ernst ascertained in the course of
their engineering studies that the exclusive costs assignable to the
mail service were only about six-tenths of 1 percent of total expenses,
and to the passenger service slightly less than 15 percent. Thus, 85
percent of the aggregate costs are common to all the services collectively. There is, therefore, a very large proporti6n of common costs
which must be shared in some way by all the products sold by the
carrier. It is precisely here that the difficulty lies. How should the
common costs be allocated among the various services which the air
carrier sells? The mail, together with passengers, enjoys top priority;
freight, express, and all other secondary matter can be off-loaded so
that these two primary services can be served. This is as it should
be; but it means that the mail must bear a fair share of the, common
costs of operating the entire service.
The central argument advanced against a cost standard is that
there does not exist any objective method by which to allocate the
common or joint costs among both the primary and secondary services;
that any method of allocation, whether it be upon the basis of tonmiles, weight, space, revenue, or any other yardstick, represents only
the judgment of the agency or individual adopting the particular
method. Under such circumstances, it is further contended that a
"synthetic" average cost of air-mail service, though almost wholly
speculative and unreliable, would take on the appearance of scientific
reliability, following the pattern of the "big lie technique as practiced
by Hitler and Stalin."
WAhat these critics of a cost approach to air-mail-service rates fail
to recognize is that the pricing of joint products is determined primarily by economic forces which operate under competitive market
conditions. Witnesses went at length into the pricing processes of
such joint-product industries as meat packing and the marketing of
petroleum products, pointing out that the market prices of such joint
products are governed not by apportioned costs but by competitive
conditions and the relative strengths of the various product demands.
As applied to that kind of setting, their conclusions as to the limited
significance of apportioned costs in determining the actual market
prices which can be realized for particular joint products is demon-
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strably true. Here the compulsions of the market place rather than
any close measurement of particular costs are controlling.
However, the analogy to the conditions of air-mail service is not
sound. By its very nature, the Post Office is the sole purchaser and
user of the air-mail service, and it could not well be otherwise.8 The
postal service is a Government monopoly. Hence, the conditions
required for competitive price determination in a commercial market
do not apply, and it is idle to draw conclusions on the basis of a hypothetical situation which does not exist in fact.
When it is said by the critics to be "literally impossible to make an
objective separation of the costs of the several products of a joint-cost
industry" this does not mean that costs cannot be apportioned by
some standard of measurement, for obviously they can be. The real
issue is whether a significant cost analysis and an equitable allocation
can be made in the particular circumstances of the air-mail transport
service.
Up to a year ago, the CAB apparently employed only the most
superficial cost analysis by types of services. The Board looked upon
a carefully analyzed cost determination by types of services as a difficult task involving controversial policy decisions which it considered
not essential to its functions in administering the "need" provisions
of the act. However, in the recent "Big Four" mail-rate case, where
a rate not involving subsidy was at issue, the Board's staff undertook
an extremely detailed cost determination based in part upon original
cost studies made by the carriers. The classification of services and
the allocations of joint costs developed were summarized by the Chairman of the Board in his testimony to the committee.
Your committee could have spent many hundreds of thousands of
dollars with engineers and accountants trying to find a sound procedure for allocating airline costs by types of services. However, it
seems to us that the development of a satisfactory cost analysis is
a matter of evolution which can best be developed by the Board as
an expert administrative agency, after giving thorough consideration
to conflicting views on all aspects of the problem.
While critics of a cost standard for air-mail service rates may always
insist that there is something inherently reliable and impracticable
about such a procedure in rate-making, because it is based upon judgment, your committee notes that Government rate-regulating agencies
in comparable circumstances, with the approval of the courts, are
making increasing use of cost analyses and allocations in their determinations. This is not to say, of course, that every rate problem
can or should be readily resolved by some mechanical costing process,
3 A closer approach to competitive market conditions in the air-mail service
would be operative if the Post Office were to make contracts for the transportation of air-mail on the basis of competitive bidding by the airlines. There is not
much doubt, however, that if this policy were to be adopted the resultant air-mail
service rates might be considerably lower than as determined in accordance with
the cost standard prescribed.
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nor does S. 436 require adherence to any particular cost formula. The
I.C.C. has frequently found it necessary in rate situations to take account of competitive and demand conditions, especially where commercial traffic is involved. We also note that the I.C.C. has given
particular emphasis to cost studies and procedures in fixing the rates
of railway mail pay, and it is not our understanding that disproportionately higher rates have been allowed above costs in recognition
of the great value of the mail service to the country.
The Value of Service Concept
Because of the asserted lack of objective standards in allocating
common or joint costs there have been many proponents, including
most air carriers, of the recommendation that separation of the mail
rate from subsidy should be accomplished under a standard of "value
of service." A considered decision to adopt a cost standard requires
that the proposed value-of-service standard be examined and that the
committee reasons be stated for rejecting it. In general, this standard
is one which looks at the price to be paid from the purchaser's point
of view - what the service is worth to him. It is the principle generally
followed in a free market in pricing competitive products for sale. The
price is set at a level which is low enough to create mass demand, yet
high enough to assure a profit. All prices must be in excess of out-ofpocket costs and the failure of some commodities to meet their fully
distributed costs is offset by the fact that other commodities pay more
than their fully distributed costs.
The difficulty with the concept of value of service as applied to
the air-mail service, however, is what has been mentioned above there is only one customer or user - the United States post office. Since
the Government is the sole user, the usual competitive market factors
by which to measure the value of service in practical terms are lacking.
The post office is now required to tender air mail to the airlines, as it
should be, and this requirement is further strengthened by section 4
of the bill. As there is no satisfactory available competitive form of
transportation (the post office cannot use the nonsubsidized irregular
airlines), there is no way of determining what the optimum price for
carrying it should be to attract the greatest volume. The real consumer is the public who mails the letters and air parcel post-packages,
and it pays the postage rates fixed by the Congress; consequently,
the carrier cannot increase the volume of the mail service through
price adjustment to the consuming public. Subject to periodic fluctuations and directional unbalances, mail loads remain relatively stable
until the postage rate for air mail is adjusted by the Congress.
As a further argument for the value-of-service concept it was urged
that this standard is necessary so that such factors as priorities accorded to air mail over other airline traffic, arrangements of schedules
for the convenience of the post office, and other special characteristics
of the mail service requirements will be appropriately recognized in
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fixing air-mail rates. Considerations such as these, however, do not
require the use of a value standard with all of its vagaries. To the
extent that allowances should be made for factors such as actual
priorities accorded to the mails, adjustments are not precluded by a
cost standard and they can, indeed, more appropriately and specifically
be made under a cost standard than they could be under a value
standard.
In one way or another it seems likely that under any value-ofservice concept, emphasis will shift to a consideration of the over-all
financial requirements of the carriers, with the result that carrier need
would continue to be a controlling factor in the determination of
airmail rates as it does now under the existing provisions of section 406
(b) of the Civil Aeronautics Act. Such an outcome would defeat the
essential purpose of the proposed legislation which is intended to effect
a definite separation of compensatory air-mail services rates from
subsidy payments to carriers whose commercial operations may not be
entirely self-supporting but which are nevertheless considered to be
essential in the national interest.
Postal Revenue as Measure of Value
It has been suggested that air-mail service rates might be measured
on a value-of-service basis according to what the users' of the postal
service actually pay for such service as reflected by the air-mail postage revenues taken in by the post office. But this is not really a
measure of the value of the mail transportation service performed by
the airlines, even after adjustment of the gross revenues to account
for the ground expenses incurred by the post office in handling air
mail. The Post Office Department cannot be regarded merely as an
intermediary in a commercial transaction between the carriers and
the users of the air-mail postal service. Postal revenues are the result
of whatever congressional policies may be adopted with respect to
postage rates, and these policy considerations are of such nature that
postal revenues are no valid measure of the value of the transportation
service rendered by the airlines- or by the railroads either for that
matter.
Ernst & Ernst Proposal to Base Mail Rates on First-Class
Passenger Fares3a
A relatively simple solution to the problem of finding a proper
limiting criterion for determining mail service rates was put forth by
Messrs. Ernst & Ernst. It has much to recommend it because of its
simplicity and also because the passenger-fare level has appeal as a
generous ceiling for mail rates, thus guarding against the obvious
inequity of establishing compensatory mail rates at a level higher
than the charge made for premium services provided in carrying
passengers.
8a See page 358 of this issue.
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Ernst & Ernst took the position that reliance upon cost in fixing
compensatory rates was impractical and urged instead that mail
rates be established at the level of first-class passenger fares, less an
allowance for expenses which are attributable exclusively to passenger
service and are not duplicated in nature by expenses directly chargeable to the mail service. The theory underlying this proposal was
that the mail and first-class passenger services are the two premium
services performed by the air carriers; that passenger fares are established on a commercial basis, with due allowance for all of the influences affecting commercial pricing, and yet are subject to the
ultimate supervision of the CAB.
The Ernst 8c Ernst view was supported by a number of the air
carriers who contended that first-class passenger fares are one of the
best measures of the value of the mail service which they perform for
the Government. The Board opposed the proposal as a mail-rate
.standard, pointing out that passenger fares are not a satisfactory
measure of costs and that adjustments of such fares traditionally lag
more than a year behind major changes in costs. The chairman of
this committee suggested that air-coach fares at 45 cents a ton-mile,
and not first-class fares, would be more appropriate as the basic or
list price from which to adjust downward to obtain an equitable
compensatory mail-pay rate.
The Air-Freight, Air-Express Standard
In view of the apparent similarity between freight traffic and mail
traffic, certain proponents of subsidy separation legislation urged that
mail rates should be based primarily on air-freight rates. It was
not clear from their testimony whether these witnesses proposed to
apply the air-freight rates, as such, to mail shipments, or whether
they would base mail rates upon the average revenue produced by
air freight. The airlines produced samplings of the results of applying
air-freight rates to mail shipments and showed that the cost to the
Government would greatly exceed the average revenue from air-freight
shipments and would even, in many cases, greatly exceed the "need"
mail rates presently in effect. It was also shown that air-express rates
to the public, as applied to actual mail shipments, would produce
results nearly as unpredictable and varied as those derived from
applying air-freight rates.
Representative Hinshaw's Proposal-- the Weight of Mail Enplaned
One of the most novel proposals submitted to your committee was
that presented by Congressman Carl Hinshaw. His proposal would
set a flat pound rate whereby each carrier, depending on its class,
would be paid either 25 cents or 50 cents for each pound of mail
' carried irrespective of distance. In addition to its simplicity, this
proposal represented our way of reflecting the greater costs per mile
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of short-haul as against long-haul movements. The rate as urged by
Representative Hinshaw, if figured on a ton-mile basis, would result
in approximately 45 cents per ton-mile for the average length of a
mail haul, which is 1,170 miles. However, it would work out at 25
cents per ton-mile for hauls of 2,000 miles, which might be an underpayment to the long-haul carrier. The same pound rate, as applied
to very short hauls, might result in excessive payment. For a 100mile haul, the rate would yield $5 per ton-mile.4
An interesting proposal presented to the committee was that of
Mr. J. H. Carmichael, president of Capital Airlines, who stressed the
fact that the mail rates applicable to the smaller carriers should be
identical with the rate paid to the Big Four carriers for the same
competitive hauls. Otherwise, he believed that the pressure of economy would force the Postmaster General to utilize the cheaper carrier
exclusively. He therefore recommended a two-element rate containing distance blocks and weight blocks, so as to provide a higher
return per mile for short-haul, lightweight shipments and a lower
return per ton-mile for long-haul, heavy shipments.
The committee was impressed with this proposal and gave it careful
consideration. A variation thereof was prepared for our consideration
which followed the air express rate structure and was intended to
produce about the same average revenue as air express.5 While the
committee does not believe that the solution advanced by Mr. Carmichael should be the exclusive method prescribed by law for determining compensatory rates, it might well be one of the rate structures
available for the Board's consideration. S. 436 will permit the Board
to adopt such a method if found desirable.
Lastly, Mr. C. R. Smith, president of American Airlines, offered a
partial solution to the problem presented by Mr. Carmichael. He
4 Another proposal by Mrs. Lucile S. Keyes, an economist specializing in air
transportation, was introduced as S. 1756. That bill provided basically that mail
rates should be the costs derived by allocating to each unit of mail traffic a
proportion of common costs equal to that allocated to each comparable unit of
nonmail traffic. However, the bill would allow an increase in such rates if the
Board found such increase necessary to support the mail service required by
the Post Office or necessary to avoid higher over-all unit costs of the carrier. In
some situations a rate lower than distributed costs would be set by the limiting
provision that the rate could never exceed the value of service to the Postmaster
General as measured by the cost of other available comparable servics. Lastly,
no rate would be fixed at less than the added cost to the carrier for carrying the
mail. The proposal was meant to avoid the undue rigidity of prescribing fully
distributed cost as a universal rate-making standard, while avoiding also the
undue looseness of leaving the determination of compensatory mail rates entirely
up to the regulatory authority.
r The block mail-rate structure considered was based on 35 cents per tonmile haul (the average yield at this time to the airlines for air express) plus $2
for each dispatch for terminal handling expenses (the approximate amount now
estimated by the Railway Express Co. as their terminal expenses in handling
air express), and with $2.50 as the minimum charge (present minimum for air
express). The weight of mail dispatched was divided into rate blocks: 0 to 15
pounds, 15 to 50 pounds, and 50 through 100 pounds, and another block for each
additional 100 pounds or major fraction thereof. This structure produced rates
ranging from $2.50, or $3.33 a ton-mile, for the smallest weight and shortest
distance block, up to $45.75 or 36 cents a ton-mile for distances over 2,400 miles
and dispatches, 50 through 100 pounds.
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suggested that when two carriers in different mail-rate classes operate
directly parallel services, the higher rate carrier, in order to share
on equal terms in the mail traffic, should be permitted to reduce his
mail rate to that of the other carrier.
CAB Proposal of Allocated Cost Standard

The CAB, in testifying before the committee, recommended that
mail rates should be based on costs as ascertained and allocated by
it in contested rate proceedings to the various services performed.
While the Board recognized that costs could not be measured with
mathematical precision, it urged that cost determinations worked out
by the Board would bring about the fairest results to all concerned.
The Chairman of the CAB testified that the Board presently believed
that a classification of carriers for mail-rate purposes was essential
because of extreme variations in unit operating costs and volume of
service performed, but that five classes should be provided.
The testimony of the Board showed the growing maturity of its
own thinking in cost analysis, as was further demonstrated in its
recent order in the Big Four case. A final rate of 45 cents per tonmile, proposed in this order by the Board for American, Eastern,
United, and TWA, has been accepted by the Carriers. This decision
as to what the allowable costs should be, was made after years of
preparation and many conferences with the carriers and with representatives of the Postmaster General.
The Board's general attitude toward the problem of allocations
meets with the hearty approval of this committee. Their openminded approach and clear thinking is shown in the following passages
taken from the Board's order issued on August 7, 1951, in the Big
Four case:
The Board fully recognizes the innumerable difficulties inherent
in any attempt to cost the mail service as one of several common
services. It is further recognized that there are other methods of
costing the mail which can be considered reasonable. Our responsibility was to settle upon a method whlich we considered the most
reasonable. As of this time, in the present stage of development of
the industry generally, and the Big Four in particular, the mail

costing techniques and principles adopted in this proceeding currently constitute the Board's best judgment as to the most reasonable method of costing the mail. The costing techniques developed
here represent a marked step forward in relation to the less-refined
allocations employed by the Board previously. Over the future years

further refinements in techniques of costing the mail will undoubtedly be developed. With additional studies, certain costs that are
now treated as common may prove to be identified with a specific
service. Furthermore, changes in methods may become essential

to adapt the costing techniques to the changes in the stage of development of the industry.
It is also highly probable that over the future years further refinements can be developed in the construction of rate formulas.
Various forms of block rates or two-part rates might well be found
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more appropriate in the future in determining payments for carrying the mail since they might reflect more accurately the cost
characteristics of the mail service. If sharp increases in mail volume should develop as a result, for example, of the movement of all
first-class mail over substantial distances by air, some further recognition to the effect of such volume changes on the mail cost would
appear to be appropriate. A modification of the costing techniques
would be particularly essential if any change were developed in the
priority characteristics of the mail and passenger service in reference to the other services. It should be noted, of course, that the
45-cent mail rate was intended to give full recognition to the present
priority characteristics of the mail service.
Standard of Assigned and Apportioned Costs Adopted by
Committee
The committee, after studying the many proposals, arrived at the
conclusion that any recognition of a value-of-service concept for the
determination of compensatory mail rates would only open wide the
door to an endless variety of intangible contentions for justifying
unduly higher mail rates. Furthermore, your committee decided
that it would not be proper, in view of the express purpose of the
legislation to eliminate subsidy from the mail rates, to adopt merely
the simple "fair and reasonable" standard presently contained in the
Railway Mail Pay'Act of 1916. The committee felt that a definite
cost standard should be adopted to govern the Board in establishing
compensatory rates which would assure the elimination of subsidy,
and concluded that "fairly assigned and apportioned" expresses a
cost standard that will be appropriate and fair to both the carriers
and the Government. This is to be found in the language recommended by the Board.
The committee, therefore, included in section 406 (a) (2) the
requirement that all rates determined by the Board "shall be based
upon the experienced costs for mail transportation services rendered
and upon projected costs for such services to be rendered, under
honest, economical, and efficient management," and specifically requires that cost be "fairly assigned and apportioned to such mail
services, including a fair return on that portion of the total investment which is used and useful in such mail services." By the phrase
"based on" we wish to emphasize that the rates shall be determined
solely upon the basis of fairly apportioned costs as this is the only
statutory standard provided the Board. However, we specifically recognize that rates for future periods shall give due consideration to
costs projected into the future.
The cost standard adopted by your committee authorizes the Board
to determine costs and fix rates in accordance with the statutory
standard specified for individual air carriers or,by classes of air carriers,
routes or types of services. This permits the Board to apportion experienced and projected costs among the various services performed
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in a manner which will bring about the fairest and most equitable
result to everybody concerned. Of course, specific added costs for
performing the mail or other kind of service must be assigned to that
particular service.
Authority to so classify carriers, routes, and services for rate-making
purposes is an essential power to provide administrative flexibility
and to permit the Board to maintain different rate levels for different
classes of carriers. Any requirement that an entire industry must
furnish its services to the Government at uniform prices is improper.
Your committee does not insist upon the Board maintaining different
rate levels for specified classes of carriers. On the contrary, it recognizes that there may be advantages in establishing a uniform blocktype rate structure for the entire industry, which automatically takes
into account the inherent differences in cost levels between carriers.
We, however, believe that at this time it is essential to permit the
Board to continue class rates as long as necessary. The adoption of a
uniform rate structure for an industry with as many varied operating
units as air transport will require much study on the part of the Board.
Any suggestion that a single ton-mile rate based entirely on the actual
costs of the lowest cost carrier should be universally applied, even to
the smallest high-cost operators, seems clearly unfair.
Neither does your committee regard a ton-mile or a pound-mile
unit as the only accurate measure of mail service performed, and accordingly has vested discretion in the Board, as it now has, to adopt
other units of measurement for mail-rate purposes. There is precedent for this discretion. The ICC is not bound to any single standard in fixing rates for the transportation of mail by railroads nor is
the Postmaster General so bound in fixing mail rates by steamship
or by star routes.
The Board is specifically authorized to initiate proceedings for the
modification of mail rates whenever it may appear that the existing
rates are not fair and reasonable in terms of the cost standard provided.
The committee is convinced that this standard is an eminently fair
one and will result in the receipt of fair and reasonable compensation
by the air carriers in return for services rendered. We believe it
grants to the Board necessary flexibility in administering the rate
program to meet current problems as they may arise, and the changing conditions of the industry. We do not give sanction to a would-be
service rate which contains subsidy in disguise.
INTERNATIONAL AIR TRANSPORTATION

Disclosure of Subsidies to United States International Airlines
Arguments were vigorously made before your committee that in
the case of international air transportation subsidy separation should
be "deferred indefinitely." This argument was based primarily upon
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a desire to avoid damage to our international air transport system
through the revelation of subsidies paid to our international airlines,
since the same treatment would not apply to their foreign competitors.
It was pointed out that foreign governments do not make a practice
of publishing all of the subsidy data affecting their carriers; that the
competitors of our carriers are, for the most part, government-owned;
and that they receive advantages from their governments of substantial monetary value which are not revealed. These advantages
take many forms, such as acquisition of equipment, either free or on
very favorable terms; grants of capital funds without repayment, or
upon unusually favorable terms; and government absorption of foreign-exchange losses. This being the case, it was argued that the
United States carrier would be made to appear heavily subsidized as
compared with his foreign competitors, which would place our carrier
and the United States Government at a very substantial disadvantage
in maintaining satisfactory aviation relationships between the United
States and other countries.
Bilateral aviation agreements between governments provide for
control of our air carriers' rates and traffic capacity. These agreements provide that if the foreign government is dissatisfied with the
rate our carrier is charging or believes that our carrier is operating
an unduly large amount of service to that country, it may request
consultation with the U. S. Government. In these consultations the
revelation of substantial subsidies to our carriers, unaccompanied by
similar data with respect to their foreign competitors, would make
it difficult for the United States negotiators to defend a reduction in
passenger fares or air freight rates introduced to expand our carriers'
business, or an increase in capacity designed to accomplish the same
purpose.
There can be no question but that this Government has a great
stake in the maintenance of its international commercial air transport
system. It is privately owned and efficiently operated and is without
doubt the finest and most extensive in the world. It serves our farflung national interests by operating an aggregate of over 108,119
miles of air routes to 87 different jurisdictions on all continents,
flying 538 aircraft which are generally the most efficient presently
available. It is important that the Congress not unwittingly enact
legislation which might impair the continued operation and development of this system. Your committee has been deeply conscious of
its responsibility here, but at the same time has been zealous to find
a way to secure the benefits of subsidy separation for the Post Office
and the airlines in this field.
There can also be no question but that subsidy separation in the
international field involves many problems which are not present in
the domestic field. Our international carriers are in competition with
foreign operators over which the Congress has only a limited control.
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Our carriers operate into many foreign countries whose views and
policies with respect to international air transportation are not necessarily the same as ours. Our entire international air transport
system is based upon an aggregation of bilateral aviation agreements
- 44 of them - which not only establish basic rights to operate scheduled commercial services, but also spell out in some detail, as mentioned above, the economic standards which must be observed by our
carriers in providing their service. The success of our carriers is
dependent upon the continued effectiveness of this system of bilateral
agreements and their administration in such a way as to permit development of air transport services in accordance with the principles
of American enterprise.
With these special characteristics of international air transportation in mind, your committee received, in executive session, important
testimony designed to explain fully the reasons why extreme caution
had to be exercised in providing for subsidy separation in the international field, and this testimony was considered very carefully by
your committee. In such a session, on June 26, 1951, Mr. J. Weldon
Jones, Assistant Director of the Bureau of the Budget, presented the
views of the President, as follows:
Special policy questions have been raised with respect to the
treatment of international carriers in any such program of subsidy
separation. The executive agencies principally concerned with this
subject have studied this matter very carefully in recent months,
and their views have been presented to the President.
After carefully considering these views, the President feels that
the advantages of subsidy separation outweigh such special problems as may exist with respect to international carriers. Accordingly, the President feels that information on the subsidy paid to
international carriers should be publicly available, and that those
carriers should be fully subject to legislation in this field.
While your committee was thus concerned about the difficulties
presented in separating subsidy in the international field, it agrees
with the President that it should not consefit to the indefinite deferment of that part of the subsidy separation program. The manifest
advantages in disclosing to the Congress and to the public any subsidies granted to our international carriers outweigh any temporary
set-backs which may result from such a disclosure, and the authorization of forthright subsidy contracts, as provided by the bill to meet the
recognized national interest objectives in foreign air transport, will
provide the necessary stability for development. These contracts are
discussed in another section of this report.
In the event that information developed under this legislation
should be withheld in the national interest, section 1104 of the present
Civil Aeronautics Act will continue to authorize such withholding.
Under that section any person may object to the public disclosure of
information obtained by the Board. When such an objection is made,
the Board is required to withhold the information from the public
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and its disclosure would adversely affect the interests of the applicant
and is not required in the interest of the public. In addition, the
Board is authorized to withhold publication of records containing
secret information affecting national defense. It is the opinion of
the committee that this section gives to the Board ample authority
to safeguard the national interest.
International Air Carriers to Be Treated Differently from
Domestic
The distinctions between the conditions under which our international and domestic airlines operate, which were mentioned at the
beginning of this section of the report, require, however, that the
international carriers be treated somewhat differently than the domestic carriers are treated.
The United States-flag airlines strongly urged the committee to
recommend legislation which would provide that U. S. carriers be
paid the Universal Postal Union rate for the transportation of United
States mail. They pointed out that if this were done the United
States would be adopting the practice followed by most foreign countries in paying their carriers the maximum UPU rate and would
avoid any discrimination in the rates paid to United States carriers
and their foreign competitors for the carriage of our mail. Also, by
following this course, the Postmaster General could avoid being placed
in the anomalous position of either paying the United States carriers
less for transporting United States mail than he paid to a foreign
carrier, or of being compelled to withhold mail from foreign airlines
or of breaking his practice of paying them the quoted maximum UPU
rates. These witnesses countered the argument that the UPU lettermail rate might include some subsidy by pointing out that it was agreed
to at a Congress of representatives of all nations of the world and
since foreign postal administrations were paying our carriers this
rate it could hardly be a subsidy rate.
This proposal was vigorously opposed by other witnesses on the
ground that the UPU rates are rates negotiated between nations and
are not based upon elaborate cost studies or fixed by an expert regula
tory agency. According to these witnesses the UPU rate for letter
mail is unduly high, the rate having been established at $2.86 a tonmile, while the over-all ton-mile costs of most airlines range from
90 cents a ton-mile to $1.40 a ton-mile for the major operators and
on up for smaller inter-European services. These witnesses recommended that the rates of the international carriers should be fixed
in the same way and on the basis of the same considerations as domestic rates are to be made.
Your committee did not entirely agree with either one of these
points of view.
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Universal Postal Union Rates
Your committee could not reach any conclusions with respect to
the establishment of the compensation to be paid by our Government
to our carriers for transporting United States mail without careful
consideration of the Universal Postal Union, its procedures and the
rate structure which it has established, and of the importance of our
relationship with the UPU.
The Universal Postal Union is an international organization dealing with postal affairs which was organized in 1874 and has been
responsible for the unrestrained movement of the mails from country
to country since that time. At the present time it comprises all of the
countries of the world on both sides of the iron curtain (hearings,
p. 602). Every 5 years these countries meet together in a Congress.
The United States has been represented by the Postmaster General
or officials of his Department and has always taken a leading role. From
these Congresses has emerged a loose, but time-proven, body of regulations contained in the Universal Postal Union Convention which
govern the international exchange of mail and postal services within
the postal territory of the Union.
The scope of the UPU Convention is extensive and complete.
Provisions of the Convention define the types of services permitted
in international postal affairs, the physical characteristics of mail,
conditions of service, rules for service, liability, postal rates, transportation charges, rules governing disposition of revenue from postage
and fees, methods of settling international accounts, and certain
guaranties, the most important of which is the guaranty of liberty
of transit for the mail throughout the whole extent of the Union.
The Convention itself and the various congresses have always been
marked for their lack of political interference. They are dedicated
solely to the free, rapid, and efficient transit of the mail.
As is indicated above, the UPU Convention fixes the maximum
transportation charges to be paid by one country for the use of air
services operated by an airline of another country. For example, it
fixes the maximum rates that the United States Post Office may have
to pay the United Kingdom for the use of British Overseas Airways in
the transportation of United States mail. Different maximum rates
are fixed for different types of service and different categories of mail.
These rates are determined by negotiation among the countries who
participate in the UPU Congress. They are subject to change either
at the congress of the Universal Postal Union, which meet every
5 years, or through the observance of special procedures in the interim
between these congresses. In recent years the UPU and its working
committees have sought the advice of ICAO as to the cost of transporting international air mail.
At the present time the maximum transportation charges are 6
gold francs per ton kilometer for letter mail for areas other than the
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European Continent (class B), 3 gold francs per ton kilometer for
letter mail within Europe (class A) ; 1.25 gold francs per ton kilometer
for parcel post, and 1 gold franc per ton kilometer for newspapers.
In terms of United States currency and units of measure, these transportation charges are $2.86 per ton-mile outside the European area
(class B) ; $1.43 per ton-mile within the European area; 60 cents per
ton-mile for parcel post; and 48 cents per ton-mile for newspapers.
If this maximum rate structure had been applied to United States
mail carried by United States fllag carriers the yield to our airlines in
their trans-Atlantic services would have ranged from $2.13 to $2.28
per ton-mile in 1949. This includes mail carried in Europe at the
$1.43 rate.
These are the maximum rates which our carriers can secure for the
transportation of mail for foreign governments. In practice, the
carriage of air-mail between foreign postal administrations is arranged
in this way. For example, the postal administration of the United
Kingdom quotes a rate to our Post Office for the transportation of
United States mail on British Overseas Airways (BOAC). The rate
quoted may not exceed the applicable maximum rate specified in the
UPU Convention and this is the rate usually quoted. It should be
emphasized that there is nothing in the Convention, however, to
prevent the United States Post Office legally from rejecting the transit
rate quoted for service over BOAC, or any other foreign airline, because the rate is considered to be too high.
The convention does not require the U. S. Post Office to tender
any specific amount of mail to BOAC or any other foreign airline,
and many foreign countries are reported to use their own airlines
to the fullest extent possible. In the case of the United States, only
about 4 percent of our air mail going to foreign countries is transported by foreign airlines. Informal agreements are said to exist
between European airlines and postal administrations for the carriage
of mail, in consideration of preferential treatment, at less than UPU
maximum rates. Such agreements have not been encouraged, and
our Post Office Department has been a champion of high maximum
rates because this has been to its advantage. This is so because we
operate regular air service over most of the trade routes of the world,
and United States airlines have carried more mail of foreign postal
administration than foreign carriers have transported of our mail.
In the fiscal year 1950, the United States Post Office utilized the
services of 12 foreign airlines to carry 847,042 ton-miles of United
States mail at a cost of $2,151,289, or an average of $2.54 a ton-mile.
During this same year, United States-flag carriers transported 4,827,468 ton-miles of foreign countries' mail and received $10,873,846,
or an average of $2.25 per ton-mile. Thus, if the United States Post
Office should attempt to have our mail carried by foreign carriers at
lower than the maximum UPU rates we could expect a reciprocal
reduction to be imposed on our carriers for the foreign mail they
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carry. Thus, the net gain to our Post Office which under the above
figures for the fiscal year 1950 was about $8,000,0000, would be reduced proportionally.
Mail Rate Structure Adopted for United States International
A irlines
Your committee studied, painstakingly and objectively, the present
methods of making mail rates for international transportation by air
and steamship, the terms of the Universal Postal Convention, the
operation of the Congresses of that Union, and the establishment of
United States policy with respect to the Union.
It was recognized at the outset that the conclusions of the United
States Congress with respect to compensation for United States airlines might have a very substantial effect upon the actions of the
Universal Postal Union Congress as well as upon the relationships
between our carriers and foreign postal administrations. If an unreasonably low rate were fixed for our air carriers for transporting
United States mail, it might well impel the Universal Postal Union
Congress to make a drastic reduction in UPU rates. While we might
stand to lose our favorable postal balance, we would probably gain in
other respects. Moreover, since many of the foreign competitors of
our airlines are paid the maximum UPU rate by their own governments for transporting their mail, the establishment of a substantially
lower rate for United States carriers might create a false appearance
as to the relatively higher offsetting subsidies required by our airlines
as compared with those of their foreign competitors. On the other
hand, if an unreasonably high rate were fixed for the transportation
of United States mail by United States carriers, it would call into
question the soundness of the UPU rate structure which the United
States has actively supported and would put our carriers in a position
where they would have to render mail service for foreign postal administrations at a lesser cost than they do for our own post office.
Furthermore, even if the UPU rate for letter mail is thought to be
high, your committee is informed that at the UPU Congress to be
held in June of 1952, this rate may be appropriately adjusted, for
there is considerable agitation to lower this rate. On the other hand,
the UPU rates for the other categories of mail may, in some instances,
be too low since some of them are substantially below the average
ton-mile cost of the lowest cost American-flag carrier. These rates
may also be subject to adjustment at next year's UPU Congress.
From our study of these questions, two basic principles emerged
which, in the opinion of your committee, had to be incorporated in
any legislation dealing, with mail rates for our international carriers.
In the first place, it seemed essential to recognize the UPU rate structure for what it is, because it is established by a distinguished international body of which the United States is an important member.
However, we concluded that the UPU rate structure should be
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recognized only for what it is - a system of maximum rates - and pro-

vided that none of our carriers should receive a rate higher than the
applicable Universal Postal Union rate. Certainly, there can be no
objection to the adoption of this principle.
Secondly, it seemed essential that the United States Post Office
Department should be put in a position of not having to discriminate
against our own carriers by paying to foreign carriers a higher rate
than it pays to a United States carrier for performing the same service
with respect to the same category of mail. Your committee would
regard any practice which involves the United States Government
paying a United States citizen less than it pays a foreign citizen for
the performance of the same service as unsound and unconscionable.
In the maritime field the Postmaster General voluntarily pays both
foreign and United States-flag steamship companies the same rates
for transporting international mail. Certainly no further argument
is needed to support this principle.
These two basic principles we wrote into the bill as section 406
(d), and provided that, effective July 1, 1953, the Postmaster General
shall determine rates which will not exceed the applicable UPU rates
and will not be less than any rates paid by the United States to foreign
carriers for similar service.
Your committee believes that the rates for the carriage of mail by
United States-flag carriers should be fixed by a responsible Cabinet
officer with full cognizance of cost and also of the political and international considerations involved in international air transport. The
bill provides that the Postmaster General can secure complete cost
data on international air transportation from the Civil Aeronautics
Board in any manner he requires. He will be expected to be mindful
of the cost of rendering the mail service and the standards for establishing costs for the domestic mail service when he sets the mail rates
for the foreign service. These rates are to be set at not less than cost
and somewhere between the amount he pays to foreign-flag carriers
for similar services and the maximum Universal Postal Union rates.
The Postmaster will have strong incentives to keep the rates at or
near costs, but on the other hand will have to reflect administration
responsibility toward international air transportation policy, which
comes generally under the control of the President by section 801 of
the Civil Aeronautics Act.
In adopting these principles your committee has followed the practice established by the Congress many years ago in providing for payments to our steamship companies for the transportation of United
States mail. By the act of February 14, 1929 (39 U. S. C. 654), Congress gave the Postmaster General power to fix the rates for the transportation of mail by United States and foreign vessels. United States
vessels were to receive a maximum of 80 cents a pound for letters and
postcards and 8 cents a pound for other articles including parcel post.
No cost or other standard was written into this act. In the case of
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foreign vessels, he is directed to pay not in excess of the rates established by the UPU Convention.
Since that time the Postmaster General has followed in practice in
the maritime field the principles adopted by your committee. He
has issued various orders establishing rates for the transportation of
mail by United States and foreign vesels. The current order provides for payment of the same rates for the transportation of mail by
foreign or United States vessels, and with respect to the bulk of the
mail transported these rates coincide with the rates established by
the Universal Postal Union. However, the Postmaster General has
seen fit to pay less than the UPU rate for the transportation of mail
within certain very long-distance ranges. Thus in the maritime field
he, in effect, is following the practice contemplated by the present
bill in making certain departures below the maximum UPU rates.
The minimum provision specified by your committee does not
automatically bind the Postmaster General to pay the, maximum
UPU rates. He is bound only when he voluntarily permits United
States mail to be transported by foreign carriers at the UPU maximum
and then only to the extent that the services so rendered are deemed
similar. As we have seen, the UPU Convention itself does not prohibit the United States Post Office, or any other postal administration
for that matter, from quoting lower rates unilaterally or from negotiating for the carriage of mail at rates lower than the UPU maximum.
It has been suggested that this minimum provision would result
in transferring the power to fix rates for United States mail from the
United States Post Office Department to foreign postal administrations because our Post Office would have no control over the rate
quoted by a foreign postal administration for the use of its carriers.
Of course, he has no control over what foreign postal administrations
will quote, but the United States Postmaster General does have control over the extent to which he uses foreign carriers. If the Post
Office Department were to decide to pay foreign carriers a rate equal
to 50 percent of the established UPU rate for carrying United States
mail, he could make that determination completely effective. It is
again emphasized that the UPU rates are maximum rates and that
no international obligation binds him to pay them. If a particular
foreign postal administration objected to receiving the low rates he
so established, he could refrain from shipping United States mail over
the carrier of that foreign postal administration. It seems likely,
however, that foreign postal administrations would see advantage
under these circumstances in accepting the rate the Postmaster General was willing to pay. He not only can do this, but he is doing it
now with respect to the transportation of mail by steamship within
very long-distance ranges.
In providing that the lowest rate paid by the United States to
foreign-flag carriers for "similar services" will be the minimum rate
which the Postmaster General must pay United States-flag carriers,
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administrative discretion has been vested in the Postmaster General.
The committee has not deemed it practical to limit the application
of this provision to only those instances where a foreign-flag carrier
transports United States mail in parallel point-to-point competition
with an American-flag carrier. The Postmaster General has been
given the authority, to determine when the services rendered by a
United States and a foreign-flag carrier over the same or different
routes are to be deemed similar. While this may lead to some controversies, the Postmaster General can set up administrative standards
which will facilitate application. It is expected that there will be
many instances when the Postmaster General will find that there are
no similar services being rendered by a foreign-flag airline and in such
instances he has complete discretion to fix the rate to be paid United
States-flag carriers with no controlling minimum.
Transfer of Rate-Making Authority to Postmaster General
In giving the Postmaster General authority to fix the mail rates
for United States carriers your committee is proposing a substantial
change in existing law. At the present time the Civil Aeronautics
Board fixes the rates for the transportation of mail for both United
States international and domestic carriers, but under this bill will
continue to do so only for the domestic carriers.
One objection made to transferring the power to fix these rates to
the Postmaster General is that he is the shipper of the mail and in
his zeal to reduce his cost he may pay the carrier an inadequate or
an unconstitutional rate. However, there are several factors which
would prevent such arbitrary action. The Postmaster General cannot, as mentioned above, pay the United States carriers less than
he pays foreign carriers for similar services. Also, the committee
has provided at the end of the proposed section 406 (g) that the
Postmaster General may secure cost data from the Board to guide
him in carrying out his rate-making function. This procedure will
relieve him of the necessity of setting up his own cost analysis section
and of duplicating the work of the Board. Finally, there is no evidence that the Postmaster General has departed unreasonably from
UPU rates or otherwise dealt unfairly with the steamship companies
whose compensation for the transportation of mail he has fixed for
many years.
There are important reasons to justify Congress giving this power
to the Postmaster General in the case of international air carriers as it
did in the case of surface vessels. He has full responsibility for dealing
with foreign nations in international postal matters, and is in charge
of the United States participation in the Universal Postal Union.
Moreover, he has the power to fix the rates he proposes to pay the
foreign air carriers, up to the maximum limits specified in the UPU
Convention. In view of the interrelationship of these already existing
responsibilities, it seemed essential to transfer this function to him
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where the responsibility for fixing the level of rates to be paid to
American-flag international carriers will fall directly on a member of
the President's Cabinet.
One-Year Deferment of Subsidy to United States InternationalAirlines
Since present mail payments to our international airlines undoubtedly contain a substantial element of subsidy, several witnesses pointed
out that subsidy separation in this field would be of greatest benefit
in cutting down deficits in the Post Office Department's budget.
However, no convincing arguments were advanced to indicate that
subsidy separation in the international field was a matter of great
urgency, or that any substantial savings to the Government as a whole
could be expected immediately. The Chairman of the Board strongly
urged a 1-year delay in requiring subsidy separation in the international field in order that the Board might give its full attention to
the domestic problems of subsidy separation and thereby gain experience in administering the new subsidy provisions of the bill before
tackling the more delicate problems of separate subsidy grants for
foreign operations.
There are other good reasons for deferring the effectiveness of subsidy separation in the international field for a year after the domestic
separation becomes effective. A year's deferment will permit the
UPU air-mail transit rates to be reviewed at the next UPU Congress
to be held at Brussels in June 1952, and for any revised UPU rates to
become effective January 1, 1953, 6 months before the effective date
recommended in S. 436 for the international carriers. This time lag
will permit our representatives at the Brussels Congress to give due
weight to the congressional policies contained in this legislation, if
enacted, in presenting the position of the United States at the UPU
Congress.
In view of the practical reasons advanced by the Board for deferring 1 year, the committee decided to follow this course and to give the
Board a fair opportunity to accomplish the domestic portion of the
program before it becomes necessary to begin on the international
aspects. It should be noted that the President approved of this delay,
as did the Secretary of Commerce, who appeared before your committee.
SUBSIDIES FOR ESSENTIAL AIR TRANSPORTATION

Policies Governing Subsidies
It is not the purpose of S. 436 to stop the payment of essential
subsidy grants to airlines rendering service found to be essential for
the continuation and development of an air transportation system to
meet our national objectives. Accordingly, the bill provides that
subsidy grants may be made by the Civil Aeronautics Board for sub-
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stantially the same objectives as are specified in the present "need"
clause of section 406 (b) of the act, which authorizes the Board to
include subsidies in mail payments. The important change made by
S. 436, as reported, is to require the subsidy payments to be identified
and covered separately by an appropriation to the Board for this
,specific purpose.
Subsidy payments are provided for in section 406 (g) (1) for the
purpose of "maintaining and continuing the development of air transportation (including the introduction of new and improved types of
commercial aircraft) to the extent and of the character and quality
required to promote the economic development, the national defense,
and the air commerce of the United States." One important deletion
and several clarifying phrases have been added to the language of the
existing section 406 (b) of the 1938 act. The postal service has been
deleted as one of the three principal bases for subsidy, inasmuch as
the requirements of the postal service are intended to be taken care
of in the provisions for service mail rates. Specific mention is made
of the introduction of new and improved types of commercial aircraft
as a basis for subsidy. This has heretofore only been implied. The
phrase "to promote the economic development" of the United States
has been added. All subsidy determinations must continue to be made
by the Board against the standard of "honest, economical, and efficient management," as presently found in the act.
The three national-interest objectives for airline subsidy grants,
as amended by the bill recommended by your committee, do not pertain to the mail service performed and are separable from each other.
Any Federal grants to foster them should identify the objective or
objectives to which they are directed. While these objectives may not
always be susceptible of exact valuation in precise dollar terms, explicit designations of purpose nevertheless are desirable.
By these changes the committee does not mean to suggest that
subsidies should be conferred either more liberally or more restrictively than they have been heretofore; our air rather has been to
state more clearly and explicitly the public purposes for which subsidies may be justified under the revised act.
Community Approach and Withdrawal of Subsidies
No doubt Congress will insist on keeping subsidy grants to an
essential minimum, but this does not necessarily mean that drastic
curtailment of airline subsidies can be expected immediately. However, the Civil Aeronautics Board must now become a salesman of its
own subsidy promotional program. Its responsibilities become immeasurably greater. After determining the proper amount and kind
of subsidy that should be paid each petitioning air carrier, the Board
must justify this amount, first to the Bureau of the Budget and finally
to the Congress.
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The early studies of your committee indicated what has since been
confirmed:
* * * airlines carrying only a long-haul business and servicing only
a few high-density points could operate profitably without subsidy;
or, to put it another way, that the certificate requirement compelling the airlines to serve a large number of small stations, or to
carry predominantly short-haul traffic absorbed most of the profits
earned in the long-haul high-density business and was the basic
reason why subsidy was required.
No practical way to implement the identification of subsidies with
loss communities had been developed by the Board or the industry
until the committee advanced the "community" approach - in fact,
an appalling lack of available information as to the profitability of
individual stations was found in the industry. Consequently, this
committee had Messrs. Ernst Sc Ernst make an intensive engineering
study to devise a practical way of allocating airline subsidies to the
communities served at a loss. The detailed results were given to the
CAB and were also made available to all interested persons.
This community approach was advanced by your committee for
the protection of the airline industry and for the protection of the
Board. It would provide a better understanding of the economies
of the airline structure on the part of the committees of Congress,
the CAB staff, and everyone else concerned with the operation of
and competition from the airlines. It was not devised, as some witnesses intimated, a some cruel method of torture. It was devised to
be of help, to be constructive, and to form the basis of working out
many of the difficulties that the Board will face in justifying and
distributing subsidies.
The CAB concluded, nevertheless, and testified before your committee that it wanted no legislative mandate to employ the community
approach and no accounting requirements to implement it. The
airline industry itself either opposed or showed little enthusiasm and
several witnesses expresed a fear that the accounting requirements
would be unduly burdensome. Your committee concluded that it
should let the Board struggle with its increased responsibilities as it
saw fit and without attempting to impose this helping approach upon
it or the industry.
Your committee believes it to be highly desirable that the Board
have authority to discontinue subsidy payments for service by those
carriers or segments of carriers which are found to be no longer
required in the interest of the national defense, the economic development, or the air commerce of the United States. If the operation of
a route is no longer contributing to one or more of the objectives of
the subsidy provision, there can be little point in subsidizing its
continuance, irrespective of the fact that a certificate is outstanding
for such operations. Section 406 (g), therefore, provides that the
mere holding of a certificate of public convenience and necessity
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authorizing the conduct of air services shall not be deemed conclusive
as to whether any such service is sufficiently required in the interest
of the national defense or the air commerce of the United States to
justify the amount of subsidy that would be required to enable the!
air carrier to continue such service. If a certificated mail carrier
chooses to continue to operate the route it would be entitled to mail
compensation but not subsidy for its operations, unless or until service
was supended or abandoned.
Since the withdrawal of subsidy may be tantamount to compelling
abandonment of service, the provision goes on to provide that, when.
an issue of withdrawal of subsidy is raised, the Board is required to
give notice thereof to interested parties, including communities in the
United States receiving such service, and to permit them to be heard.
If the Board then decides that the need for such service does not
justify the amount of subsidy that would be required to continue it,
the final order denying such amount shall be accompanied by an
authorization for the carrier to abandon such service any time within
6 months from the date of the order. It is not intended to require
communities to be made parties to every subsidy proceeding where
the amount of subsidy required is in dispute, but only when the issue
is the amount of subsidy required to prevent abandonment of service
to a community. This provision is intended to apply in situations
where complete abandonment of airline service to a community is
threatened, and not to a mere reduction of service to minimum standards of adequacy.
A carrier is given one year after being denied subsidy to decide
whether to suspend or abandon the route or continue it in operation
without subsidy. This should give the carrier sufficient time to experiment with route and service revisions and to make a final and binding
managerial decision. The entire provision is intended to shift substantial responsibility to the carrier to suggest changes in route patterns which it deems necessary. As long as a certificate creates the
presumption that a service should be subsidized, management may
be loath to make any changes in the route patern even though the
service may have ceased to be necessary. Your committee believes
that when a service or route is no longer justified in the national
interest, a provision such as this- should spur management to ask the
Board for authority to abandon the route or service.
Subsidy Contracts for International Carriers
The character, extent, and value of our international air-transport
system has already been discused to some extent. The vast development of our international air service in recent years - in the interests
of the commerce, the- postal service, and the national defense - has
been made possible largely through subsidy programs authorized by
Congress in the Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938. The record made by
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these carriers in providing air transport in the defense of the United
States is well recognized.
While the basic subsidy policy of the 1938 act has been continued
in S. 436 for all our certificated airlines, your committee recommends
a special provision designed to make subsidization more stable for
international United States-flag carriers. Section 406 (f) of the bill
authorizes the Board, upon request of an air carrier entitled to subsidy
of its foreign air transportation, to enter into a contract with that
carrier for a period not to exceed 10 years.' This contract would provide
for the continued payment of the agreed scale of subsidy over the period
of the contract, and would require the carrier to continue to provide
the subsidized services during the period of the contract. In addition,
the carrier would undertake to return to the United States at the end
of the contract one-half of all of its profits from such foreign air transportation which exceed an average of 10 percent per annum of the
capital investment of the carrier.
This provision follows directly a similar provision of the Merchant
Marine Act of 1936, which has worked well for the merchant marine
and has enabled the United States to recapture from the subsidized carriers many millions of dollars since the close of the war. The provision
has great advantages. To the carrier it gives certainty as to the amount
of its support over a substantial period of time, which is particularly
necessary in foreign air transport where the carrier is required to make
large investments and other commitments in foreign countries. The
international carriers, unlike the domestic airlines, would not have
support generated from communities all along their routes in their
requests for subsidy grants. As far as the Government is concerned, it
gains from increased stability in the international air-transport system,
as well as from the incentive toward efficiency which is created by the
contract. The carrier is told, in effect, that if it operates with greater
efficiency during the contract period and reduces its need for subsidy,
the Government will not promptly reduce the subsidy, as is the case
under existing law, but will permit the carrier to share the rewards of
its own good work.
The unsettled state of the world makes it essential that the United
States maintain these important lines of communication operated by
our international airlines, as well as the aircraft, personnel, and equipment which maintain them. Since World War II, an additional problem has come to the fore. Competition from foreign airlines in recent
years has become extensive and keen. In the case of air transport, as
in the merchant marine, the task of American operators is made considerably more difficult by the fact that American wage levels and
other individual items of cost are considerably higher than those prevailing in comparable foreign operations. The American carriers,
6 As passed by the Senate on September 19, 1951, S.436 provided for subsidy
contracts for "foreign air transportation" up to five (5) years and for "interstate
and overseas air transportation" up to three (3) years.
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through increased efficiency, large volume of operation, and the maintenance of modern fleets have managed to keep their over-all cost
levels per unit of service on a par with their foreign competitors. In
view of these circumstances it may be necessary to continue for some
years a subsidization program for our international airline operations.
ANTICIPATED FINANCIAL

RESULTS

The only additional administrative costs that the enactment of
S. 436 will require will be for the employment of a slightly increased
personnel in the CAB and in the Post Office Department. A disbursing
section in the Board will be required to handle the accounting and
disbursing of funds for the subsidy grants. Your committee understands that the determination of compensatory mail rates by the Board
for domestic and overseas air transportation will not increase the
Board's workload or require additional personnel. Accounting and
technical personnel now required to handle mail rate proceedings
under the "need" section of the existing act can be employed for this
purpose and also in handling subsidy proceedings under the new bill.
Additional responsibilities are given to the Postmaster General by
the proposed bill, particularly 'in the setting up of mail rates for
United States-flag carriers engaged in foreign air transportation. This
will involve some additional workload but since the CAB has been
directed to furnish the Postmaster General with such cost data as he
may reasonably require and in the form he requires it, the increase
in the staff of the Postmaster General need not be large.
The greatest savings that are anticipated by the enactment of this
bill will be realized by the Post Office Department which will no longer
pay subsidies to the carriers. Your committee is not in a position to
make a firm estimate as to how much this bill will reduce the appropriations of the Post Office Department, but it has been furnished with
two tentative estimates. The first is for a recent past year showing a
saving to the Post Office Department of about $34,000,000 for domestic
mail service, and $24,000,000 for foreign mail service, including
overseas. These figures would represent a saving of about 55. percent
for domestic service and approximately 40 percent for foreign mail
service. The second estimate for the fiscal years 1951, combined both
domestic and foreign air mail and indicated a total savings of about
$47 to $50 million.
Your committee is not in a position to estimate how much of the
foregoing savings to the Post Office Department may also be saved to
the taxpayer. The result in this respect will depend upon the extent
to which separate subsidy grants are made to the airlines.

